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Weak feedbacks, governance mismatches, and the robustness of social-
ecological systems: an analysis of the Southwest Nova Scotia lobster fishery
with comparison to Maine
Allain J. Barnett 1 and John M. Anderies 1
ABSTRACT. The insights in Governing the Commons have provided foundational ideas for commons research in the past 23 years.
However, the cases that Elinor Ostrom analyzed have been exposed to new social, economic, and ecological disturbances. What has
happened to these cases since the 1980s? We reevaluated one of Ostrom’s case studies, the lobster and groundfishery of Port Lameron,
Southwest Nova Scotia (SWNS). Ostrom suggested that the self-governance of this fishery was fragile because the government did not
recognize the rights of resource users to organize their own rules. In the Maine lobster fishery, however, the government formalized
customary rules and decentralized power to fishing ports. We applied the concepts of feedback, governance mismatches, and the
robustness of social-ecological systems to understand the pathway of institutional change in Port Lameron. We revisited the case of
Port Lameron using marine harvesters’ accounts collected from participant observation, informal interviews and surveys, and literature
on fisheries policy and ecology in SWNS and Maine. We found that the government’s failure to recognize the customary rights of
harvesters to organize has weakened feedback between the operational level, where resource users interact with the resource, and the
collective-choice level, where agents develop rules to influence the behavior of resource users. This has precipitated governance
mismatches, which have led harvesters to believe that the decision-making process is detrimental to their livelihoods. Thus, harvesters
rarely participate in decision making and resist regulatory change. In Maine, harvesters can influence decisions through participation,
but there is a trade-off. With higher influence in decisions, captains have co-opted the decision-making process. Nevertheless, we suggest
that the fisheries of SWNS are more vulnerable to social-ecological change because of weaker feedbacks than in Maine. Finally, we
have discussed the potential benefits of polycentricity to both fisheries.
Key Words: Atlantic Canada; collective choice; institutional analysis; lobster; Maine; polycentricity; robustness
INTRODUCTION
The insights in Governing the Commons (Ostrom 1990) have
provided foundational ideas for commons research for more than
20 years. Ostrom (1990) showed that resource users can act
collectively to manage common pool resources (CPRs) and
proposed 8 design principles that foster collective action and self-
governance. These insights were based on an analysis of 86 case
studies of fisheries, forests, and irrigation systems. However, what
has happened to the cases discussed in Governing the Commons?
Do Ostrom’s design principles confer robustness to social and
ecological change?  
We reevaluated one case study from Ostrom (1990), the lobster
and groundfishery of Port Lameron, Nova Scotia, to answer these
questions. Ostrom (1990) suggested that the self-governance of
this fishery was fragile because (1) the resource users did not have
strong collective-choice arrangements, and (2) the government
did not recognize the rights of resource users to organize. We
examined the consequences of these two sources of fragility over
time. We reevaluated the case using a framework to analyze the
robustness of social-ecological systems (SESs) developed by
Anderies et al. (2004). Although we confirm that these lacking
design principles lead to fragility, we uncover subtleties that
strengthen Ostrom’s argument. By examining the deep
interactions between institutions and people in a specific
biophysical context, we find underlying feedbacks that explain
the absence of these missing design principles. We show that the
SES framework allows researchers to move beyond examining
institutions toward more holistic analyses of dynamic
interactions among components of complex systems. 
Although researchers contribute to case study knowledge of
CPRs, few have revisited cases to analyze their dynamics over
time. However, Brewer (2012b) revisited Acheson’s (1988) The
Lobster Gangs of Maine and demonstrated the utility of this type
of analysis. She applied ideas from political ecology and
poststructuralism to Acheson’s work to show how the politics of
scale, heterogeneity among resource users, and subjectivities that
emerge from political decisions influence SESs. Ostrom
(2007:15182) called for “strong interdisciplinary science of
complex multilevel systems” to diagnose SESs; studies such as
that by Brewer (2012b) and the one we present respond to this call. 
Because Maine has often been described as successful in self-
governing the lobster commons, we compare its institutional
pathway to that of Port Lameron. We will show that some of the
successes of the Maine system have been attributable, in part, to
the presence of stronger internal feedbacks than Port Lameron’s
system exhibits. Davis (1975) first discussed the case of Port
Lameron. Davis described a significant change in the federal
government’s approach to governing Atlantic Canadian fisheries.
Based on Davis’s work, Ostrom (1990:177) characterized the Port
Lameron fishery as institutionally fragile. She predicted that the
federal government’s approach would continue to provoke
“counterproductive reactions” from marine harvesters, fail to
“gain control over open-access deep-sea fisheries,” and “lose
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control of some inshore fisheries previously subject to entry
control.” We expand on the work of Ostrom and Davis, using
harvesters’ accounts collected from participant observation,
informal interviews, and surveys. We supplement this data with
primary and secondary sources. We apply the robustness
framework in our analysis of this data to understand how key
features of SESs contribute to or detract from good governance. 
In a theoretical best-case scenario, SES governance institutions,
i.e., Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO) and local lobstering
communities, would each take on roles that leveraged the different
types of information available to each group. DFO and local
communities would be loosely linked and work collaboratively.
However, in Port Lameron, weak feedbacks in the SES have
created a less optimal scenario; Maine’s SES more closely
approximates the best-case scenario. We compare the institutional
changes of the two fisheries to identify what went wrong in Port
Lameron with what went right in Maine, while still maintaining
a critical perspective on the institutional evolution of the Maine
fishery, as has been suggested by Brewer (2012b).  
Our comparison suggests how polycentrism might improve
fisheries governance in the future. Polycentric systems have “many
centers of decision-making” acting at different scales (Ostrom et
al. 1961:831). Each governing unit has the autonomy to develop
its own institutions based on its specific knowledge of the system.
Units can interact horizontally to learn from neighboring units
and vertically at the appropriate scale to deal with conflicts or to
solve problems like “non-contributors, local tyrants, and
inappropriate discrimination” (Ostrom 2010:552). In hierarchical
governance, governing bodies are neatly nested within higher level
bodies. In polycentric governance, jurisdictions are messy, are
overlapping, and come from public, private, and voluntary sectors
(McGinnis and Ostrom 2012). We highlight some of the feedbacks
and interactions that could be strengthened by polycentricity in
both Maine and Port Lameron.
METHODS: QUALITATIVE CASE STUDY ANALYSIS
THROUGH AN SES LENS
Early SES research originated from the ecological sciences and
did not consider political or economic processes. Ostrom (1990)
initially focused on the ability of CPR users to develop effective
and long-enduring institutions but did not focus on the external
influence of political economy or the biophysical dynamics of
resource systems (Agrawal 2001, Mansfield 2004). Resource users
adapt their institutions to the spatial and temporal variability of
a resource over a long period of time. However, the rapid changes
associated with globalization have exposed resources and their
users to new disturbances (Young et al. 2006, Anderies and
Janssen 2011). Ostrom (2007) expanded on previous CPR work
and developed a framework to understand social and ecological
dynamics and processes that occur at local to global scales. SES
research has developed to pay more attention to how institutional,
ecological, and livelihood diversity affect the capacity of SESs to
respond to economic and ecological change (e.g., Folke et al. 2003,
Berkes and Seixas 2005, Miller et al. 2010). It has also called
attention to the importance of matching the scales of governance
systems to the economic and ecological problems they face (Cash
et al. 2006, Young et al. 2006). We look at the feedbacks between
different levels of an SES and the potential for resource users to
act collectively to adapt to new economic disturbances.  
Because SESs are complex, system elements can be defined in
various ways. Anderies et al. (2004) suggested the elements and
relationships as shown in Figure 1. This framework, based on
Ostrom’s design principles, highlights key interactions between
the operational level, where resource users interact with the
resource on a daily basis, and the collective-choice level, where
agents develop rules to influence the behavior of resource users.
In this conceptualization, SES refers to complex adaptive systems
composed of human and nonhuman subsystems and embedded
in larger systems. Complex adaptive systems have diverse
interacting biophysical and social components and an
autonomous selection process by which some components are
reproduced (Arthur et al. 1997, Levin 1998). Complex systems
adapt to change through these interactions and selection
processes, and hierarchical organization emerges in the absence
of a global controller (Levin 1998). An SES is composed of two
human units: resource users and public-infrastructure providers.
Resource users can be broadly defined to include environmental
groups, municipalities, and other stakeholders. Public
infrastructure includes elements of social capital and rules in use,
as well as physical capital, such as artificial reefs or other human-
built environments that affect resource dynamics. In Port
Lameron and Maine, public infrastructure is primarily composed
of rules and social capital.
Fig. 1. The social-ecological system, as conceptualized by
Anderies et al. (2004).
SESs often exhibit nonlinear dynamics as the rules of local
interactions change over time (Levin 1998). Humans act on
components of the system, attempting to adapt to change or to
transform the system when existing interactions can no longer be
supported by its components (Walker et al. 2004). This element
of human activity, in which humans attempt to “design” SESs to
maintain life-supporting functions, is referred to as robustness
(Anderies et al. 2004). An SES is considered robust if, when
exposed to disturbances, institutions and human interactions are
able to prevent regime shifts that would make people unable to
harvest a resource or likely to experience “long-term human
suffering.” To maintain SES robustness, decision makers must
navigate trade-offs, but enhancing robustness to one type of
disturbance can increase the fragility of a system to others. For
example, Anderies et al. (2007) showed that policies robust to
uncertainty about the biological stock of fisheries were vulnerable
to uncertainties in harvesting and revenues.  
System components interact through flows of information,
nutrients, energy, and materials (Levin 1998). These flows are
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iterative, and components coevolve when rapid feedbacks allow
them to alter the patterns of their interactions over time (Levin
1983, 1998, Walker et al. 2004). In Figure 1, the arrows between
system components represent iterative interactions and feedbacks
over time. As social-ecological dynamics change, SESs may need
to adapt by changing operational rules (Anderies et al. 2004). In
the Maine and Port Lameron fisheries, we examined the
endogenous links at the collective-choice level between resource
users and public infrastructure providers, between public
infrastructure providers and rules and social capital, and between
the resource users and rules and social capital. The processes at
the collective-choice level interact with operational-level
processes, consisting of interactions between rules and social
capital and fishing practices, and between harvesters and the
resource. 
We did fieldwork in Barrington, Southwest Nova Scotia (SWNS),
Canada, to collect data with which to animate the framework.
Barrington, known as the “lobster capital of Canada,” consists
of a large number of interlinked communities and ports. Davis
(1975, 1984a, b) conducted his research in Port Lameron, Brazil,
and Pagesville, pseudonyms for Port La Tour, Baccaro, and
Smithsville. We use Port Lameron to refer to these three
communities and SWNS to refer to the whole region. Our data
came from field notes; informal and semistructured interviews
with association leaders, buyers, and harvesters (N = 31); and
general survey information (N = 113) about the relationships
among harvesters, associations, and government. We
supplemented our field data with a literature review of fisheries
policy. Subsequently, we analyze data that emphasize changes that
have occurred in Port Lameron and SWNS since Davis (1975).
The setting
The basic characteristics of the Port Lameron fishery in the 1970s
and 2012 are summarized in Table 1. We estimated the number
of crew members by multiplying the number of vessels by the
average number of crew members per vessel (1.28, from survey
data). We added crew members to captains to estimate the total
number of resource users. Although the number of vessels and
resource users in Port Lameron has remained relatively constant,
the structure of the fishery has changed. 
In the 1970s, Port Lameron harvesters made their living from
many species including cod (Gadus morhua), halibut
(Hippoglossus hippoglossus), herring (Clupea harengus), mackerel
(Scomber scombrus), and lobster (Homarus americanus).
Following the groundfish collapse and subsequent fishing
moratoria in Atlantic Canada, the DFO tightened restrictions on
inshore groundfishing vessels. By 1997, all types of vessels were
regulated through individual transferable quota programs
(Crowley and Palsson 1992, Peacock and Annand 2008). In
Shelburne County, which includes Port Lameron, the number of
groundfishing vessels decreased from 633 in 1996 to 156 in 2005
(Peacock and Annand 2008). The DFO also reduced the quota
for inshore vessels from 3309 in 2000 to 938 in 2011 metric tons.
Despite these efforts, the DFO (2009) stock assessment found a
high rate of unexplained cod mortality, perhaps attributable to
increased predation from grey seals (Halichoerus grypus) or to
discarded or unreported landings. Although historically
groundfishing was the most important livelihood activity,
lobstering has become the “backbone” of the maritime coastal
economy. Compared to the 1970s, a larger percentage of a fishing
household’s income is derived from the lobster industry.
Dependence on lobster has influenced the economics of fishing
in the region and the structure of the fleet.
Table 1. Characteristics of the Port Lameron fishery in the 1970s
and today. Values are counts and averages, and ranges are show
in parentheses.
 
Characteristic 1970s 2012
Number of vessels
(inshore)
42 40
Number of vessels
(offshore)
10
Number of resource
users
99 91
Inshore vessel length (< 11.9 m) 11.9 m (9.1 m-14.9 m)
Offshore vessel length (11.9 m-18.3 m)
Inshore vessel width (< 3 m) 4.6 m (2.7 m-5.8 m)
Offshore vessel width (3 m-4.9 m)
Percentage of income
from lobster
40 82 (13-100)
Today, fishing vessels are generally larger but less varied than in
the 1970s. Davis (1975) distinguished between offshore and
inshore fleets. Offshore vessels were more capital intensive, with
larger crews, more fishing gear, and more sophisticated
technologies. These boats were often specialized for
groundfishing. Smaller inshore vessels were less specialized,
fished closer to shore, and used simple handline techniques.
Today, the distinction between offshore and inshore vessels is
unclear, and all vessels are sized to meet lobster-fishing eligibility
requirements. DFO regulations state that lobster vessels cannot
exceed 15.2 m in length, but the regulations do not limit width.
License holders fish for lobster more intensively than they did in
the 1970s and have put more pressure on grounds as far as 50
miles (80.5 km) offshore (DFO 2013). To accommodate this shift,
vessels have become larger, wider, and more capital intensive.
Governing the lobster commons
In the 1970s and 1980s, Port Lameron harvesters were similar to
the “lobster gangs” of Maine. Harvesters in Maine and Port
Lameron collectively asserted a right of first access to nearby
fishing grounds based on their historical use, membership in the
community, and economic dependence on the grounds (Davis
1984b, Acheson 1988). Within these zones, they allocated
subzones to harvesters using different technologies for different
species. These subzones reflected localized “knowledge of
relations between species, as well as the composition/complexity
of the resource zone” (Davis 1984a:145). The subzones also
reduced conflicts among harvesters using different technologies
(Ostrom 1990). Fishing groups defended their boundaries from
outsiders and newcomers through social sanctions, such as
shunning or slander, or physical sanctions, such as destroying
fishing gear or threatening violence. They sanctioned rule
breakers in proportion to the seriousness and frequency of
infractions.  
These boundaries were flexible and informal. In both Maine and
Port Lameron, boundaries were negotiated among harvesters
within and between ports. Thus, the boundaries changed as
harvesters responded to changing social, ecological, and
economic conditions (Brewer 2012a), and harvesters defended
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Table 2. Comparison of rules governing the Maine and Port Lameron lobster commons. NP indicates that a rule is not present in that
social-ecological system.
 
Rule Both Maine Southwest Nova Scotia
Minimum size restriction 82.5 mm
Maximum size restriction 127 mm NP
Trap limit 600-800 250-375
Seasons NP November-May
Prohibitions Egg-bearing females
V-notched lobsters
Trap Requirements Trap-tags
Biodegradable panels
Juvenile escape vents
Maximum trap dimensions
Limited entry License waiting lists Transferable licenses
Vessel Requirements NP 15.2 m maximum length
their territories more vigorously when fish were scarce (Davis
1984b). Fishing community members maintained their system of
rules through local customs and reinforced it through frequent
interactions at sea and on land (Davis 1984a, Acheson 1988,
Brewer 2010). Ostrom (1990) suggested that this informal system
kept the costs of monitoring low because harvesters could interact
frequently, and it was easier to see when and where a harvester
used a certain technology than it was to see the type of fish caught. 
The current rules in Maine and Port Lameron (see Table 2) are
similar but have different emphases. Both fisheries have prohibited
the landing of egg-bearing females and set minimum size
requirements for more than a century, but the details of these
rules have changed over time (Parsons 1993, Wilson et al. 2007).
In Maine, rules emphasize recruitment of future lobster
generations by preserving egg-bearing lobsters and lobsters with
v-notches cut in their tails by harvesters. This and minimum size
requirements allow a sufficient percentage of lobsters to mature
and reproduce before they can be harvested. Maine’s “maximum”
size requirement also protects larger, more fecund lobsters. Rules
in SWNS emphasize limiting fishing inputs and effort. “Inputs”
refers to the technological capacity of a vessel to catch lobsters.
Trap limits and vessel-size limits aim to protect the fishery from
overcapitalization. Fishing seasons limit effort to November
through May, allowing lobster stocks to recover in the off-season.
The seasons in Canada’s 40 lobster-fishing areas (LFAs) are also
staggered throughout the year to reduce market gluts. We found
that Maine and SWNS differed most in their relationship to
government agencies, Maine’s Department of Marine Resources
(DMR) and DFO.
Relationship to government agencies
Ostrom (1990) suggested that Port Lameron’s rule system was
fragile mainly because it was not recognized by the DFO. In 1977,
Canada claimed jurisdiction over fishing grounds within 200 miles
(322 km) of the coast under the “Law of the Sea Convention”
(Matthews 1988). Rapid postwar expansion of industrial foreign
trawlers had brought Atlantic groundfish stocks to the brink of
collapse (Rogers 1998). By declaring the 200-mile (322-km) limit,
the federal government assumed control over both offshore,
exploited by trawlers, and inshore fisheries. This shifted the
balance of authority from the provinces to the federal
government. Although the provinces recognized customary rules
(Martin 1979), the federal government thought that these rules
left the seas open access and free to all. To the federal government,
the only option to protect the seas was top-down regulation. 
The United States passed its Fisheries Conservation and
Management Act (FCMA) in 1977, claiming federal jurisdiction
over seas within its own 200-mile (322-km) limit. The newly
created National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) set management goals for the Maine lobster fishery.
However, the FCMA also created Regional Fisheries
Management Councils and mandated that NOAA appoint
fishing-industry representatives to negotiate federal management
goals (Brewer 2012a). This initiated an “unfriendly dance”
between federal agencies and the lobster-fishing industry, with
harvesters rejecting federal proposals for regulatory change
(Acheson and Knight 2000:16). Leaders in the lobster industry
and the DMR organized and lobbied for decentralized
management authority. These lobbying efforts led to passage of
the Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Cooperative Management Act in
1993 and a DMR bill establishing comanagement zones in 1995
(Acheson and Knight 2000, Acheson 2003). Under these laws,
federal agencies ceded much of their authority to the Atlantic
states and to elected industry representatives. The federal
government has formally recognized the right of Maine’s lobster
industry to organize and develop rules, something that has not
happened in SWNS. Maine lobster harvesters have also been able
to organize effectively to lobby for recognition of their rights.  
Ostrom (1990) argued that lack of recognition of local rights to
organize creates conflicts between customary and federal rules,
and within the community as harvesters attempt to circumvent
local traditions by appealing to federal rules. Because these
conflicts would ultimately erode the customary rule system, she
saw collective-choice arrangements in Port Lameron as “weak.”
In Missing feedbacks and governance mismatches, we describe how
the informal rule system in Port Lameron and the DFO’s failure
to recognize it has produced conflicts and governance
mismatches.
MISSING FEEDBACKS AND GOVERNANCE
MISMATCHES
We wanted to understand the feedbacks flowing through the Port
Lameron system, as diagrammed in Figure 1. Governance is
essentially a feedback mechanism through which collective
decision-making arenas process information and translate it into
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actions that feed back into the system and maintain or alter its
state (Anderies et al. 2013). Good governance builds appropriate
feedbacks to guide systems toward outcomes desired by
managers, harvesters, and other agents. Our analysis of the SWNS
system revealed that missing and inappropriate feedbacks have
led to poor governance and introduced new fragilities into the
SES.
Missing feedbacks: poor state-resource user relations
We found that the DFO’s failure to recognize harvesters’ rights
to organize rules and harvesters’ weak collective-choice
arrangements have reinforced each other. Since the 1970s, Port
Lameron’s local feedback loop, where harvesters develop
infrastructure to alter their fishing practices, has eroded (Fig. 1).
The weak relationship between the federal government and Port
Lameron’s harvesters has reduced harvesters’ capacity to act on
their knowledge and thus has removed a feedback critical to the
system.
Weak collective-choice arrangements
Rules that are congruent with local social and ecological
conditions are often the product of collective-choice
arrangements, in which “most individuals affected by the
operational rules can participate in modifying [them]” (Ostrom
1990:93). Collective-choice arrangements are more likely to be
made when the benefits of collective decision making are higher
than the costs, e.g., in money or time.  
In SWNS, customary rules competed with DFO rules, which
“have different origins, reflect different principles, and are
motivated by different objectives” (Davis 1984a:140). The first
major conflict between the DFO’s top-down approach and the
customary rule system was the Pubnico Affair in 1983, which
centered on a dispute over trap limits. Though trap limits were
passed in 1968, officials did not begin to crack down on fishing
over the limit until the 1980s (Kearney 1989). The crackdown led
to a series of protests and disputes between the state and
harvesters, culminating in May 1983, when about 100 harvesters
burned and sank 2 DFO patrol vessels (see Davis and Kasdan
1984, Kearney 1989, for a more detailed account).  
In the wake of the Pubnico Affair, the DFO established Working
Groups of lobster harvesters; the groups first met in June 1983
(Kearney 1989). This signaled a shift in the DFO’s approach from
top-down management to comanagement. The Working Groups
established organizations to represent harvesters’ interests; these
later evolved into the LFA management boards and advisory
committees that operate today. License holders at each wharf elect
a port representative; the representatives attend LFA
management board and advisory committee meetings with DFO
representatives. The management boards also have elected
chairpersons. 
However, all of these positions can be daunting and thankless
because harvesters vent their frustrations about the lack of
positive change on representatives, who must try to explain to
their constituents the slow process by which policies can be
modified. There has been a high rate of turnover among
representatives (field interviews, 2012). Some harvesters see the
management boards as “yes men” for the government rather than
representation for the industry. This view has led to the formation
of more radical associations that have vowed to “take back the
industry.”  
Port Lameron harvesters see the LFA boards and committees and
their decisions as having low legitimacy (field survey, 2012). The
majority of the harvesters we surveyed wanted the DFO to
directly incorporate harvesters’ knowledge and ideas into
decisions; some called for a democratic process in which
harvesters could make decisions themselves. Although a large
majority of harvesters (71.1%) paid dues to fisheries
organizations, well over half  (61.1%) seldom or never attended
meetings. Those who attended did so to get information and know
what was coming. The majority stated their reasons for not
attending as having no say in the decision-making process, arguing
and fighting among harvesters, and a lack of positive change.
Many said that there was no sense in attending meetings because
they did not change anything or because they merely legitimized
the decisions the “bureaucrats” were going to make anyway (field
interviews, 2012).  
When Davis studied the Port Lameron fishery in the 1970s,
harvesters criticized the DFO most for not consulting with them
prior to developing rules and for making rules that did not reflect
regional differences in practices and socioeconomic conditions
(Davis and Kasdan 1984). In an unpublished survey conducted
by Davis in 1988, 97.6% of Nova Scotia harvesters believed that
the DFO should consult with them, and 66.1% believed that
harvesters’ views should have legal status in the decision-making
process. Today, harvesters can consult with government, but the
federal minister of fisheries retains decision-making authority. In
the past, harvesters were cynical about the DFO rules because
there was no consultation process; today, they see the existing
consultation process as inadequate because it does not
incorporate their views.  
In other Canadian Maritime regions, harvesters have united to
represent their interests, e.g., the Newfoundland Fishermen,
Food, and Allied Workers Union (Kearney 1989). However, in
SWNS, the unions and associations that formed in the 1980s could
not settle differences and provide a unified voice for harvesters
(Kearney 1989). Today, the associations have changed, but
intragroup divisions remain. SWNS harvesters hold diverse
attitudes because of their geographic isolation and a diversity of
operations and strategies (Apostle and Barrett 1992). Harvesters’
attempts to organize have frequently been thwarted by problems
of leadership, accountability, transparency, and reputation.
Harvesters and other community members often told us stories
about leaders who were corrupt or engaged in socially
unacceptable behavior. Corruption was often attributed to gains
made by some in the groundfishery, and the stories aroused
suspicion about the intentions of would-be leaders.  
The conservative Protestant culture in much of SWNS also
impedes harvesters’ ability to self-organize. “The industry and
much of rural Nova Scotia value individualism, believe
unshakably in free enterprise, and intensely dislike big
government and big companies” (Apostle and Barrett 1992:301).
Much cynicism toward government stems from the real and
perceived relationships between government and the corporate
sector. For example, Barrett (1984) described government support
for expanding the groundfish-processing capacity and trawler
fleets of National Sea Products Limited. Many harvesters whom
we interviewed recounted events such as this one, which reinforce
the idea that government represents the “big guy’s” interests, not
those of fishing communities. This perception persists despite the
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fact that the subsidies have ended and many large corporations
such as National Sea Products have gone bankrupt since the cod
collapse. 
In Maine, license holders directly influence policies within their
fishing zones, but problems have arisen because some license
holders have attempted to co-opt collective-choice arrangements
(Brewer 2012a). As state management agencies tried to rationalize
the fishery through a comanagement system, license holders
strategically advanced user-boundary rules and license entry-exit
ratios that facilitated consolidation of their own access and power.
Two factors made this possible. First, license holders were the
primary stakeholders in the decision-making process, to the
exclusion of crew members and other community members.
Second, decisions were made through voting with anonymous
mail-in ballots, so individuals were not accountable to the rest of
the community. Although customary decision making had struck
a balance between “communitarian and individual interests”
(Brewer 2012a:398), the comanagement process effectively tipped
the balance toward license-holding boat captains. Thus, although
harvesters in Maine have more say in decision making than those
in Port Lameron, the consolidation of power by license holders
may generate distributional problems. The consolidation of
license-holder power could be checked by polycentric governance,
which provides for vertical and horizontal interactions among
overlapping organizations.  
Although the time costs of participation in comanagement may
be high for harvesters in both Maine and SWNS, the benefits are
higher in Maine, at least from the perspective of license holders.
In SWNS, harvesters think it unlikely that their participation will
lead to rule modifications. We concluded that the link between
harvesters and government is the primary weakness of collective-
choice arrangements in SWNS. Maine and Port Lameron face
different dilemmas, but both would likely benefit from polycentric
governance. In Port Lameron, greater local autonomy would
allow ports to maintain their customary institutions. The
management boards and advisory committees would facilitate
interactions between ports, which could foster institutional
learning. Management boards and ports could interact with
processors, unions, and other groups that cut across jurisdictional
boundaries. Federal agencies would continue to contribute
scientific knowledge, set broad management goals, and help solve
dilemmas that the ports or management boards could not. In
Maine, horizontally and vertically interacting organizations
could provide checks on the power of any one group.
The misrecognition of customary rights to organize
The DFO’s failure to recognize customary rights in SWNS has
played out much the way Ostrom (1990) expected it would. We
found clear signs that the customary rule system described by
Davis (1984b) had weakened over time. We also found that
harvesters and buyers used DFO rules and enforcement to gain
an advantage in price bargains or to limit their competitors’
success (field interviews, 2012). 
One rule that has weakened over time is the “gentlemen’s
agreement” to set traps at enough distance to avoid “snarls” and
competition for lobsters. In the past, harvesters who set their traps
too close to those of others were likely to be punished with
shaming or property damage (Davis 1984a, b). Many of the
harvesters we surveyed expressed frustration with those who did
not respect the gentlemen’s agreement. They attributed failure to
honor it to the fact that harvesters often encounter vessels from
different ports, especially on offshore grounds, and to increasingly
“cutthroat” attitudes. For instance, if  one harvester were pulling
up traps with high catches, a cutthroat harvester would shift his
traps close to, or even on top of, the first harvesters’ traps.  
In Maine, customary rules and property relations have been
recognized by the state, but in SWNS, state rules and local customs
clash. These clashes have weakened the efficacy of local-level
customary institutions. A polycentric approach to governance
would add new layers of institutions that would not weaken those
that are working but could deal with problems that local-level
institutions have been unable to solve.  
In Port Lameron, harvesters stated almost unanimously that they
either wanted a real seat at the decision-making table, or that they
should make the rules themselves. Some harvesters were afraid of
the latter because they believed that harvesters are greedy or too
diverse to agree on a decision. DFO officials also questioned the
ability of harvesters to be stewards of the oceans (field interviews,
2012). Thus, improved connections between resource users and
public-infrastructure providers are hindered by a lack of trust
among the parties involved.
Pathways of institutional change and governance mismatches
The poor relationship between the DFO and resource users in
SWNS has weakened system feedback at the collective-choice
level, where rules that influence fishing behavior are modified to
promote fishing activities that fit with current social, economic,
and ecological conditions. An analysis by Finlayson (1994)
provides a good example of how weak links produced fragilities
that led to the collapse of the Atlantic cod fishery. Although
inshore harvesters were concerned that cod stocks could not
sustain the rate of exploitation in the late 1980s, the DFO did not
address these concerns until it was too late.  
Because of SWNS’s weak feedbacks, ineffective rules are more
likely to be made there than in Maine, where links are stronger.
“Effective” rules are congruent with local biophysical and socio-
cultural conditions and ensure that the benefits of participating
in management exceed the costs (Ostrom 1990). Ostrom (1990)
suggested that Port Lameron’s customary rules were effective, but
governance mismatches were set in motion before Governing the
Commons was published. Subsequently, we discuss governance
mismatches in SWNS, using examples of user boundaries,
resource boundaries, and trap limits.
User boundaries and social preferences
Self-governing SESs set boundaries on who can access, and
participate in management of, the resource. These user boundaries
ensure that “outsiders” will not reap the benefits of user efforts
to maintain a resource. However, well-defined boundaries that do
not fit local norms can create a sense of uncertainty that these
benefits will be realized. 
In Port Lameron and SWNS, user boundaries are enforced by the
DFO through a limited-entry licensing system. The minister of
fisheries implemented limited-entry licensing in response to letters
from harvesters and organizations seeking restrictions on
“moonlighters,” i.e., part-time harvesters with alternative
employment (Bodiguel 2002). The majority of these letters came
from regions with high dependence on unemployment insurance
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benefits and areas limited by winter ice, including Cape Breton
and the Gulf coast of SWNS, but not from Port Lameron
(Bodiguel 2002). However, the DFO’s implementation of the
limited-entry system was unsatisfactory because it reduced
flexibility to use technologies and catch species according to
economic and ecological variation (Davis 1984a, Ostrom 1990).
Thus, harvesters obtained licenses for all species and technologies
to maintain this flexibility. As the DFO began to see its errors, it
attempted to reduce the number of license holders by adding
requirements that harvesters demonstrate license use. So
harvesters increased their efforts considerably by using new
technologies and vessels to demonstrate use (Davis 1984a),
undermining DFO objectives. 
Since the inception of limited-entry licensing, the DFO and
fishing communities have struggled with the institutions
surrounding licensing. Questions center on whether access to a
fishery is a privilege or a right, to whom these rights or privileges
should be extended, and on the value of a license. Answers to
these questions are clear in writing, but unclear in practice.
Although the DFO considers access to fisheries as a privilege
bestowed by government, harvesters consider it their right based
on a history of use (Davis 1984a). Over time, the DFO added
licensing criteria to provide access only to bona fide harvesters,
with clear dependence on fishing, and to deny access to processing
companies and moonlighters. However, although licenses are not
formally transferable, a provision allowing transfers has opened
the door to a gray market in licenses. Legal decisions and
extralegal contractual arrangements have opened the door
further, so that processors, buyers, and other companies can own
and lease out licenses (Bodiguel 2002). Some individuals have
begun to speculate on license prices, buying, and selling according
to market fluctuations (field interviews, 2012). The market in, and
speculation on, lobster licenses has increased the economic value
of a license significantly. Before limited entry, a license was worth
Can$0.25; shortly after limited entry in 1970, a license cost
Can$250. After 1999, the value of a license in LFA 34 has gone
up to more than Can$500,000 (Bodiguel 2002).  
In Maine, the state and captains have defined user boundaries
(Brewer 2012b). Only one lobster-fishing zone has no limitations
on entry (Brewer 2012a). The creation of limited-entry programs
in the United States was influenced by workshop discussions in
which Canadian harvesters gave an “impassioned warning to
American fishermen, telling them not to follow the Canadian
example” (Bodiguel 2002:279). Because of these warnings and
deliberations among state and industry representatives, Maine
pools licenses and distributes them to harvesters on a waiting list
(Bodiguel 2002). Brewer (2012b:396) provides evidence
suggesting that some harvesters in Maine have pushed for
transferable licenses, but that the inflated license values
experienced in SWNS would be “abhorrent to virtually all Maine
fishermen.”
Spatial scales of resource boundaries
Resource users often define a resource boundary or territory to
which their rules apply. The degree to which boundaries can
effectively manage a resource depends on the fits between the
spatial scales of social, political, and economic systems (Cash et
al. 2006). Clear, impermeable boundaries in SWNS predate those
in Maine. In 1968, the DFO created LFAs, splitting coastal regions
into resource zones (Miller and Breen 2010). The spatial
governance mismatch created by these zones has precipitated
conflicts within and between LFAs. The conflicts mirror those
that have occurred in Maine since comanagement began in the
1990s.  
The clash between customary and state-defined boundaries is
pronounced in Port Lameron because it is located next to the line
that separates LFAs 33 and 34 (see Fig. 2). This line also separates
harvesters from a portion of their ancestral fishing grounds. As
the effort of harvesters to the southwest of the line expanded
outward, neighboring harvesters began to enforce the boundary
more rigorously by reporting line violations to enforcement. As
officers increasingly charged Port Lameron harvesters for fishing
illegally over the line, the harvesters formed a group that lobbied
government to move the line to the southwest. This was a highly
contested process, and the line remains unchanged (field
interviews, 2012).
Fig. 2. Comparison of customary lobster and general resource
territory for Port Lameron described in Davis (1984a) and
current state-defined resource boundaries. Numbers correspond
to lobster fishing areas or districts. Data source: Coffen-Smout
et al. (2013).
DFO boundary lines give a license holder the right to fish in any
fishing ground within their district. With increasing mobility and
storage capacity, many vessels venture farther from port in search
of bigger catches. Some Port Lameron harvesters expressed
frustration about harvesters coming from the northeast to fish
the southern grounds of LFA 33 and about their own inability to
claim access rights within customary territories.  
Maine’s comanagement zones are divided into districts with
council members elected by license holders (Brewer 2012a). Still,
Maine’s comanagement zones are larger than the territories of
traditional harbor gangs. The rescaling of resource boundaries
has had similar effects on customary territoriality as those in Port
Lameron. Brewer (2012a) recounted conflicts between adjacent
harbor groups that historically shared fishing grounds before they
were divided into separate zones. Some harvesters have
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interpreted license ownership as a right to fish anywhere within
state-defined boundaries, which has weakened the customary
territoriality of harbor gangs.
Trap limits and social, economic, and ecological conditions
Although a trap limit is a useful input control, the DFO trap limit
in SWNS was a governance mismatch because it did not account
for the heterogeneity of fishing communities and livelihood
strategies, and because it was based on a rationality that was
foreign to harvesters. In Maine, harvesters developed trap limits
voluntarily in some cases, and in others, they have been able to
influence trap limits through the comanagement structure. When
developed voluntarily, trap limits reflect harvesters’ definition of
the social or ecological dilemma and their preferred solution to
that dilemma. Harvesters have been able to tailor the trap limit
to their own social preferences when the limit has been developed
within a comanagement structure.  
The Canadian government established trap limits in 1968 (Miller
1990) but did not enforce them until the 1980s. Before trap limits,
the number of traps used was a function of harvesters’ ecological
knowledge of heterogeneous lobstering grounds (Davis and
Kasdan 1984). The suitability of a given trap number depends on
many biophysical, economic, and social conditions, including
trap design; bait quantity and quality; soak time; lobster
behavioral patterns; water temperature; lobster wharf price;
characteristics and heterogeneity of local lobstering grounds;
costs of labor, fuel, and bait; and the captain’s personal
preferences (Miller 1990, Acheson 1998, 2003, Brewer 2012a).
Although trap-usage decisions were previously congruent with
local conditions at a fine spatial scale, and varied within and
among ports, new regulations have homogenized decision making
at the larger LFA scale. Trap limits may have approximated LFA-
wide averages when created, but they lacked the spatial
distinctions harvesters have customarily been able to make.
Kearney (1984) found that 80.4% of harvesters favored trap limits
to control fishing effort, but the suggested limit varied from 308
to 546 among different communities and vessel sizes. In LFA 34,
the trap limit was set to 375, while LFA 33 had a trap limit of 250.
The higher limit in LFA 34 reflects the struggle over trap limits
and also the fact that fishing grounds there are, on average, more
productive than those in LFA 33. Trap limits would perhaps have
created less conflict if  the rules had reflected greater influence
from harvesters and had better approximated the heterogeneity
of the fishing grounds and fishing practices.  
The DFO’s rationale for introducing trap limits was based on the
bioeconomic objective of maximizing economic yield (MEY;
DeWolf 1974). Assuming that customary management practices
are absent and that harvesters act individually to maximize their
profits, lobster harvesters would use more traps than the
economically optimal number. However, these assumptions did
not account for the customary rules in the majority of SWNS
ports (Davis and Kasdan 1984) and the fact that harvesters
preferred to maintain income stability through flexible practices
and multispecies fishing (Davis 1984b, Davis and Kasdan 1984).
The MEY rationality for trap limits was foreign to the practices
and objectives of SWNS harvesters.  
The mismatch between MEY theory and SWNS reality may
partly explain increased trap use after trap limits enforcement in
1983 (Kearney 1989). Davis and Kasdan (1984) pointed out that
harvesters perceived the limits to be a target. Additionally, just as
harvesters retained flexibility by using licenses they did not need
at the time, lobster harvesters may have increased trap usage to
maintain the option to use the maximum number in the future.  
In Maine, some harbor gangs developed trap limits, but not to
achieve MEY. In the 1970s and 1980s, influential harvesters on
Monhegan and Swan’s Islands persuaded others to adopt trap
limits within their territories and petitioned the state of Maine to
formalize them (Acheson 1998). In these cases, trap limits were
implemented to solve distributional battles. Harvesters using
many traps created gear congestion at sea and controlled a large
portion of the lobstering grounds, limiting the ability of others
to get their fair share (Acheson 1998). Monhegan and Swan’s
Islands developed trap limits to solve problems that they perceived
at the local level.  
In the 1990s, NOAA and the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries
Commission pressured harvesters to implement trap limits to
limit fishing effort and conserve the resource (Brewer 2012a).
However, federal and state governments delegated these decisions
to comanagement zones. In each zone, harvesters decided whether
they wanted trap limits and what the limits should be. All zones
adopted trap limits that ranged from 600 to 800 traps (Brewer
2012a). Harvesters voted for these limits to solve dilemmas they
perceived at their ports, mainly distributional issues caused by
individuals who “hogged” the resource and congested the
lobstering grounds (Brewer 2012a). Even with official limits set,
harvesters within a zone may still be able to develop individualized
strategies. As in SWNS, however, the number of traps used in
Maine increased after trap limits were set. However, the trap limits
did stop the trend of increasing trap usage throughout the fishery
(Brewer 2012b).  
In SWNS, trap limits did not fit local conditions; instead, they
homogenized the fine-scale management strategies harvesters had
customarily used. In contrast, Maine harvesters have been able
to implement trap limits that reflect the dilemmas they perceive.
Nevertheless, and excepting Monhegan and Swan’s Islands,
Maine trap limits have had a homogenizing effect similar to that
in SWNS. Still, we can conclude from the outcomes discussed
previously that SESs with stronger feedbacks, like Maine’s,
develop rules that fit better with social-ecological conditions than
do those of SESs with weaker feedbacks, like SWNS.  
When implemented in the 1980s, the SWNS trap limit program
was a governance mismatch. However, most harvesters now
perceive it to be beneficial. In our 2012 survey of 113 respondents
in SWNS, 102 wanted to see trap limits stay the same; 1 wanted
them increased. At an LFA 34 management board meeting in
June 2012, the DFO informed harvesters that it will no longer be
responsible for the trap-tag program. Trap tags allow enforcement
officers to determine if  a trap has been placed legally and thus
are essential to enforcing trap limits. Many harvesters were
concerned that the LFA management boards would not be able
to assume responsibility for the program in the time frame set by
the DFO. They were concerned that previous problems would
return with some harvesters hogging the grounds and placing up
to 1500 traps. Harvesters have adapted to the DFO-set trap limits
and see them as vital to protect the fishery. However, despite their
acceptance of current trap limits, the conflicts created by the
initial policy implementation remain a source of distrust.
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Table 3. Harvesters’ responses to questions about decision making and participation.
 
Question Response Percent
What changes would you like to see to the decision-making process? A consultation process/incorporating input and
knowledge of harvesters
54.5
No change at all 23.2
Harvesters should make the decisions
democratically themselves
12.2
Do you pay dues to an association or organization? Yes 71.7
No 26.5
How often do you attend association or organization meetings? Always 6.2
Frequently 32.7
Seldom 37.2
Never 23.9
What motivates you to attend organization or association meetings? Getting information/knowing what’s coming 55.7
Working for the future of the fishery 13.6
Having a say in decisions that affect me 10.2
Making a living in fishing 8
What discourages you from attending association or organization meetings? No say in decision-making process 20.6
Arguing among harvesters 19.6
A lack of positive change 16.8
Poor leadership or organization 8.4
No time to attend 8.4
Always hearing bad news 7.5
Mismatches and feedbacks between operational and collective-
choice levels
Weak feedback makes it difficult to change rules as conditions
change. Harvesters’ resistance to change exemplifies this difficulty
(see Table 3). Many SWNS harvesters see no benefit to being
involved in the rule-making process. Many resist rule changes. Of
the harvesters we surveyed, 52.4% wanted no changes to lobster-
fishing regulations, and 12.4% suggested some method of limiting
fishing effort. In the fall of 2012, as the November fishing season
approached, the LFA 34 management board had license holders
vote on temporary effort reductions to lessen the fall glut and
improve wharf prices. This measure, which would reduce trap
limits from 375 to 300 in the fall, was voted down by 60.6% of
harvesters. There are 4 often-stated reasons for harvesters’
reluctance to modify current rules. First, if  a rule does not have
the anticipated or desirable effects, the bureaucratic process of
government will respond too slowly to calls for removing or
modifying it. Second, some harvesters believe that despite
historical drawbacks, current rules are working for now. Third,
many believe that any rule change will inevitably benefit one group
of harvesters more than others. Finally, some harvesters believe
that any rules coming from the DFO will only damage their
livelihoods (field interviews, 2012). Harvesters perceive the
benefits of participating in the decision-making process to be low
and the costs to be high.  
To summarize, the weak link between resource users and the DFO
has produced rules that reflect DFO rationalities with little
influence from harvesters. These rules have affected the behavior
and dynamics of the harvesting process in ways that resource users
deem detrimental. These negative perceptions of the effects of
DFO rules have reduced harvesters’ participation in the
coproduction of rules at the local level. Polycentric governance
would allow harvesters more autonomy in determining trap limits,
as has occurred in Maine. Ports using different trap limits could
learn from the successes and failures of their neighbors. The DFO
would still play an important role in enforcing user and resource
boundaries, but these boundaries would incorporate local-level
boundaries. This would strengthen the feedbacks at the
operational and collective-choice levels and facilitate adaptation
as conditions change. Subsequently, we discuss some of the
adaptation failures caused by the weak feedback loops currently
in place.
Missing feedbacks, governance mismatches, and outcomes
Maine and Canada have taken different fisheries conservation
measures, but the ecological outcomes have been similar. Lobster
landings have increased by 3.6 and 4.8 times in Canada and the
United States, respectively, since 1975 (Steneck and Wahle 2013).
There has been a significant increase in recruitment of larval
lobsters to both fisheries (Fisheries Resource Conservation
Council 2007). Catch per unit of effort has also increased since
1982 and remained stable in the past decade (Fisheries Resource
Conservation Council 2007). These trends suggest that the
conservation measures adopted in Canada and the United States
have been successful. 
Recent studies of Atlantic ecosystems, however, have suggested
that governance may only partially explain the rising abundance
of lobsters. Steneck and Wahle (2013) suggested that the current
success of lobster fisheries is an unintended consequence of
failure to manage the groundfisheries of Atlantic Canada.
Although Atlantic cod have historically dominated the Atlantic
Ocean as a top predator, the fishing boom of the 1960s to 1980s
effectively removed cod as a trophic level. The “ecological
extinction” (Estes et al. 1989) of cod has pushed the Atlantic
ecosystem into an alternative stable state dominated by
crustaceans and crabs (Zhang and Chen 2007). In the cod-
dominated state, even large lobsters were prey (Steneck 1997).
Today, mature lobsters are virtually free from nonhuman
predation even in offshore waters (Wahle and Steneck 1992). 
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Steneck et al. (2011) argued that the apparent success of
conservation measures has created a “gilded trap” for Atlantic
fishing communities. The combination of rising profits in the
lobster fishery and declining profits in other fisheries has
encouraged traditionally multispecies fishing communities to
concentrate on lobstering. Once fishing communities set out on
this path, it becomes increasingly difficult to change direction. In
Maine, harvesters have been able to maintain or improve their
incomes (Steneck et al. 2011). In Canada, the potential value of
landed lobsters has not been realized because of increased gluts,
in which 50% of lobsters were estimated to be caught within the
first 15 days of the season (Weston 2009). The gilded trap has
tightened since the economic crisis of 2008, which decreased both
demand for lobster and access to credit, as well as increased the
cost of bait and fuel (Weston 2009). Harvesters’ main strategy for
responding to low prices has been to try to catch more. This
strategy initiates a vicious circle, exerting higher pressures on
lobster stocks and further lowering wharf price (Theriault et al.
2013). In Barrington, 54% and 71% of harvesters reported a
decrease in income and ability to save, respectively, since 2006,
and Barnett (2014) found an increasing rate of household
foreclosures since 2000. The population of SWNS has declined
by 2.8% from 2008 to 2012, with an 8.1% decline in the population
of 15- to 34-year-olds (Statistics Canada 2013). These economic
problems are because of gluts and low prices, low economic
diversity, harvesters’ dependence on lobster for incomes, and the
high costs of entry associated with Canadian licensing and quota
policies (Barnett 2014).  
Harvester responses to low prices were individual. When asked
what they do to respond to low prices, 41.6% of harvesters replied
that they stored their lobsters, 30% reduced costs by conserving
fuel and bait, 23% did not change anything, and 13% tried to
catch more. The exception to these individual responses was the
May 2012 strike, during which a large proportion of LFA 34 and
some of LFA 33 stayed at the wharf until buyers guaranteed a
Can$5 wharf price. However, the strike revealed divisions among
and within fleets caused by geographic and economic differences
(Barnett 2014). Although harvesters gave mixed reviews of the
tactic’s success, all agreed on the importance of organizing. There
were calls for a similar tactic as the November 2012 lobster fishing
season approached, but it became clear that many captains would
not participate. As a result, status quo fishing led to gluts and a
low wharf price of Can$3.  
Individual strategies have kept some fishing households in
business, but new challenges to this lobster-dominated fishery
may lie ahead. In the late 1990s, warm water temperatures and
high lobster abundances led to an outbreak of lethal shell disease,
causing a crash in the Rhode Island lobster population (Castro
et al. 2006). As the seas warm, more southern species have begun
to invade northern waters (Steneck and Wahle 2013). Lobstering
communities and their governance regimes will likely need to
adapt to a “brave new ocean” (Steneck and Wahle 2013).  
Steneck and Wahle (2013) argued that we will need to be more
“agile” in dealing with new challenges. We argue that agility
depends on the efficacy of the feedbacks between the collective-
choice and operational levels of ocean SESs. Although Port
Lameron’s economic problems do not stem from feedbacks within
the SES, the potential for collective action to solve externally
caused problems has not been realized because the feedbacks
between the operational and collective-choice levels are weak.
Holland (2011) demonstrated that harvesters could improve their
profits in the Maine lobster fishery by reducing their harvesting
efforts or changing their harvesting schedule. These strategies
would reduce the gluts in both Maine and SWNS and shift effort
to times when the demand for lobster is higher. Harvesters can
effect change at their ports by negotiating schedules with buyers
or, at the regional scale, by lobbying for rules that better fit social
and ecological conditions. However, license holders and crew
members must participate in the development and
implementation of these strategies if  coastal livelihoods are to
improve. 
Despite the trend of lower wharf prices each season, license
holders have resisted changing the way they fish. Their lack of
trust in the effectiveness of decision making by the DFO,
associations, and leaders has played a big role in their resistance.
Although the conservation rules in both Maine and SWNS have
been effective in conserving the stocks, harvesters in SWNS have
not taken a proactive role in adapting the rules to solve social and
economic problems, and this has negatively impacted fishing
livelihoods. 
This dilemma exemplifies our main argument, that although
achieving conservation goals is crucial to the robustness of
fisheries, the rule-making process must not compromise the
potential for collective action. Maintaining strong feedback
between the operational and collective-choice levels ensures that
future social-ecological goals can be met through collective
action.
DISCUSSION
Figure 3 summarizes important changes in Port Lameron
according to the SES framework. Our longitudinal analysis of
the SES and comparison with the Maine SES demonstrate how
the lack of two of Ostrom’s design principles, i.e., strong
collective-choice arrangements and government recognition of
customary institutions, precipitated governance mismatches.
There are mismatches between boundary rules and social
preferences, spatial mismatches, and trap limits that do not fit
local social and economic conditions. The mismatches have
reinforced the weak feedback between the SES’s operational and
collective-choice levels. Harvesters have little influence on
decision making in SWNS and perceive the benefits of
contributing to the comanagement structure to be small. The
combination of governance mismatches and harvesters’
perceptions of participation has resulted in deterioration of
critical feedback between resource users and the resource, as well
as deterioration of users’ capacity to generate livelihoods from
the resource. Based on this finding, we hypothesize that similar
governance mismatches are strongly related to a lack of
recognition of rights to organize and weak collective-choice
arrangements. We add to Ostrom’s (1990) argument by
uncovering feedbacks that explain the absence of these missing
design principles and governance mismatches. This analysis
provides insights into the interactions between people,
institutions, and biophysical systems that generate fragilities. By
better understanding these interactions, we may be able to
promote interactions and feedbacks that promote robust SESs.
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Fig. 3. Comparison of the Port Lameron social-ecological
system in the 1970s (Davis 1984a, Ostrom 1990) and in 2012.
The comanagement structure of SWNS has mostly disempowered
harvesters and motivated them to seek alternatives to the official
rule-making process. Alternatives have included direct action,
protest, property damage, and the formation of more radical
associations. Comparison of the pathways in Maine and SWNS
reveals an important trade-off  in comanagement processes, the
trade-off  between empowering resource users to influence
decision making and regulating from the top down. Although
comanagement comes with a threat that powerful groups will co-
opt the decision-making process, strong top-down regulation
often results in rules that do not fit local conditions. However,
top-down governance regimes are not immune to co-optation.
Some have argued that political and economic agents have
attempted to steer Atlantic Canadian fishing policies in a new
direction and have attempted to do so by limiting the possibility
for feedback from coastal communities (see CURRA 2012).
Dilemmas such as these may be avoidable by refining collective-
choice rules to reflect the interests of a broader spectrum of
stakeholders and by strengthening feedback.  
The SWNS harvesters we interviewed took a very negative view
of the Canadian fisheries management regime, but what might
have happened if  the DFO had not intervened? In a perfect world,
perhaps the traditional management regime would have been
sustainable, as long as its rules were not destabilized by
globalization and its associated transformation of social,
ecological, and economic dynamics. However, change has created
disturbances beyond the local level. The state has played an
important role in restricting user boundaries to bona fide
harvesters in some regions and limiting the encroachment of
foreign trawlers on fish stocks exploited by coastal communities.
This story is not about whether the state should have intervened,
but about the relative benefits of polycentric feedback
mechanisms. 
To avoid weak feedbacks and governance mismatches, future
institutional innovations would need to recognize the importance
of multiple levels of governance. The case for polycentricity
applies to both Maine and Port Lameron. In Maine, overlapping
governance regimes, vertically or horizontally, can check the trend
toward consolidation of power. In SWNS, ports could make
decisions at a local scale, while organizations at the LFA level
could facilitate learning among ports and mediate conflicts. The
DFO could provide support for local institutions and help solve
dilemmas that spill over local and regional boundaries. At each
level, these organizations would be able to contribute knowledge
and institutions that match with different scales. Brewer
(2010:289) suggested polycentric governance institutions for the
Maine fisheries to facilitate policy entrepreneurship, “more
flexible and opportunistic institutional design, more mutable
boundaries, and less fixed and exclusive loyalties among
members.” American and Canadian lobster fisheries can learn
from each other’s successes and failures, and polycentric
governance that crosses national borders can facilitate further
learning.  
Despite the different pathways of the institutions and governance
regimes of Maine and SWNS, the ecological outcomes are similar.
However, we argue that there is greater potential for harvesters in
Maine to engage in collective action to solve the economic and
ecological problems they currently face, as well as those that may
arise in the future. In SWNS, the potential for locally congruent
harvester-influenced rules to solve this dilemma is low because
collective-choice arrangements are rigid. This rigidity makes the
SES fragile. However, the potential for adaptive change still exists,
thanks to the solidarity that remains among harvesters in ports
and municipalities. Rather than influence the public-
infrastructure providers, i.e., state government, harvesters can fill
institutional lacunae by becoming infrastructure providers
themselves and developing locally relevant rules to smooth out
supply and improve livelihoods. 
The Canadian government has adopted a policy of austerity since
the 2008 economic crisis. It announced Can$79.3 million in
funding cuts to the DFO from 2012 to 2015 (Bissett 2012).
Macdonald (2013) estimated that these cuts would eliminate 1164
DFO jobs, a 10% decrease. This loss will likely constrain the
knowledge-generating capabilities of the DFO (Hume 2012). To
maintain operations, the DFO closed 3 offices in Nova Scotia,
moved from face-to-face to online licensing services, transferred
the costs and responsibilities of the trap-tag system to lobster
management boards, and shifted the costs of the at-sea observer
program for quota fisheries to the harvesters (Comeau 2012).
Despite these changes, the top-down consultative decision-
making process remains.  
To respond to these challenges, harvesters in SWNS formed the
LFA 33 and 34 Tags and Licensing Association to manage trap
tags and to assist harvesters who are now required to renew their
licenses online (Comeau 2013). Although efforts to change rules
through management boards and the DFO have largely been
ineffective, associations have organized harvesters’ strikes and
pushed for the opening of a cooperatively managed lobster-
processing plant on Cape Sable Island, 25 km from Port Lameron
(Bennett 2013). The DFO has been influenced by, and granted
greater decision-making authority to, organizations that have
effectively represented harvesters in some regions of Atlantic
Canada (Kearney 1989). Current events in SWNS indicate
renewed efforts by harvesters to organize. However, to do this
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successfully, harvesters in SWNS will have to unite a diversity of
opinions into one voice. 
Low opportunity in the groundfishing industry contributed to
harvesters’s tendency to shift and expand to lobster. In SWNS,
the decline of groundfishing was partially because of declining
groundfish populations, but also because of the high costs of
entry and quota leasing costs (Barnett 2014). However, when
incomes from lobster decline, Barnett (2014) observed that
harvesters suggested that they attempted to supplement their
incomes in the groundfishery despite high lease costs and tight
margins. This underscores the importance of understanding the
interactions between fisheries, as well as the implications that
these interactions have for ecological stewardship, collective
action, and livelihood outcomes.
Responses to this article can be read online at: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
php/6714
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